Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Th e European Union distinguishes itself in the fi rst place by its internal market which guarantees the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour (Articles 26-66 TFEU). Th e possibilities off ered by the internal market to deliver goods and services in other Member States have an infl uence on the pay and working conditions of employees in the various Member States. Indeed, these pay and working conditions 129 are an important part of the cost price of goods and services. Consequently, through the competition between producers and suppliers of goods and services the pay and working conditions under which these goods and services are delivered can be put under pressure. Given that in the absence of a thorough harmonisation at the European level, employment protection remains, to a large extent, a matter for the Member States, this pressure not only leads to a form of competition of social norms between the Member States but also to competition between workers who are subject to diff erent levels of employment protection.
Th is competition is not limited to the relations between the Member States. Th e European internal market also makes it possible for employees to go and work in other Member States or to be posted there by their employers. Th at way regulatory competition can also occur within the territory of the same Member State. Indeed, the internal market also infl uences the defi nition of the territorial scope of national labour law, in particular when a cross-border aspect is involved. Moreover, the growing occurrence of cross-border elements is an unavoidable consequence of the growing European market integration. As a result there can be circumstances in which work carried out on the territory of a certain Member State is not necessarily subject to that Member State's labour law. Th ese restrictions on the application of the host Member State's labour legislation in its own territory undeniably pressurises the protection level of this Member State. In the same vein, it off ers employers from sending Member States the possibility to take competitive advantage of the diff erences in employment protection and its costs.
Th is article looks into the question of the extent to which European internal market law has resulted in this kind of competition in social norms between Member States, and the extent to which it has infl uenced the territorial application of labour law. First we refer to the origins of the principle that labour law continues to be a matter of national competence (2) and comment on the regulatory competition between Member States in the fi eld of pay and employment protection (3). Subsequently we examine the European rules and case law relevant for the defi nition of the territorial scope of national labour law (4). Th is includes the law on the freedom of movement for workers, the rules of private international law (PIL) as well as the Court of Justice (CJ) case law regarding the freedom to provide of services. We pay special attention to the meaning of Posted Workers' Directive 96/71 and analyse how this Directive and the case law of the Court of Justice relating to this are at the crossroads of legal rules and economic interests. Finally, we draw some conclusions on the ensuing competition between workers in the European internal market (5).
IN PRINCIPLE LABOUR LAW CONTINUES TO BE A MATTER OF NATIONAL COMPETENCE
At the start of the European integration in the 1950s labour law was deliberately left out of the European sphere of competence. Th e EEC Treaty of 1957 hardly paid any Intersentia attention to social law and social policy in general. Th e focus was on the establishment of a common European market with the four freedoms (goods, persons, services and capital) and competition policy as the corner stone. Th e idea was that the increase of productivity as a result of the creation of a common market would automatically lead to the improvement of the living and working conditions and that therefore the EEC only had to be awarded few, if any, powers in terms of social law. 1 Th is starting point also complied with the Member States' wish to decide for themselves how to deal with social matters with due attention to the characteristics of their own social and political structures. Th is is called 'embedded liberalism' 2 : freeing the market was considered to be the responsibility of the international and/or supranational level, yet this free market was embedded in social policy and social law schemes that were to remain the exclusive right of the national states. Th e Member States retained the authority to compensate for possible negative eff ects of the internal market through their social legislation. Th is is one of the elements as a result of which the creation of the European internal market was legitimised. Incidentally, it was expected that through the functioning of the common market the Member States would be able to boost their social protection. 3 Now, more than 50 years later we know that it did not exactly go that way. Th is is not the place to analyse the manner in which the relationship between the internal market and social law has evolved at political and legal levels. 4 However, summarising, we could say that the economic integration of the Member States through the internal market most certainly has had an impact on practically all fi elds of the legislation and policy of the Member States, and that territorially and nationally conceived social law has not escaped this infl uence. Th rough the so-called 'negative integration', which, among other things, aimed at the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons and services, social legislation came under pressure. Th is social legislation was regarded by the Court of Justice (CJ) as a possible obstacle to this free movement. 5 been trying to fi nd a balance between the economic market freedoms, which were granted the status of 'fundamental rights' 6 and the employment protection in the national law of Member States. In doing so the social dimension was pushed into a subordinate and defensive role which is clearly illustrated in the much-discussed judgments by the Court of Justice in Viking and Laval. 7 Despite the fact that the Member States' labour law has ended up in the economic and social context of the European internal market, the European legislature itself has only intervened to a limited extent in this matter. Th e small repertory of European employment rules and regulations is a result of the limited powers granted by the European treaties to the European legislature 8 as well as of the absence of a political consensus to make ample use of these powers. It is still a matter of what has been described by Scharf as the 'constitutional asymmetry' within the EU between the economic objectives and internal market law on the one hand and the social objectives and social law on the other. 9 Th is has led, among other things, to the fact that at the European level economic objectives continue to be the dominant ones and infl uence and restrict the social law and social policy of Member States.
Yet, the European legislation that has been developed over the past decades should not be ignored. It is not our intention to analyse this development in depth in this contribution but we do want to state that in a number of fi elds this legislation has produced a far-reaching form of harmonisation, such as in the matter of the ban on discrimination, and health and safety in the workplace, and in other fi elds harmonisation, albeit less thorough, through minimum standards, e.g. with regard to working hours, the restructuring of undertakings and the rights of workers with a-typical employment contracts. However, as regards other essential elements of both individual and collective labour law, national law has retained its leading role. Th erefore the question is whether this has given rise to indirect social competition between the Member States, a form of competition which is said to have put downward pressure on labour law protection in the Member States. 10 581-609; S. Guibboni 16 Th is goes to show that apparently European labour legislation has a double objective: market adjustment as well as market promotion. As for the latter, European employment law wants to create a 'level playing fi eld' of social rights in order to avoid disruption of the competition between the undertakings of the various Member States. 17 Yet, as the result is nothing but a very fragmentary form of European labour law one can hardly refer to European labour law as an entity.
So in principle, the diff erences between the Member States, both in terms of the structure of labour law and in terms of the level of the workers' rights and protection, are maintained. In the present European Union with its 28 Member States these diff erences are even bigger than during the development of the European internal market in the 1960s. Th is means that within the European internal market it is still possible for Member States to try to give their undertakings competitive advantages by cheapening the employment protection they have to off er their employees. Within the internal market this kind of competition of social norms means that for the actors in this market the diff erences between the legislation of the Member States could be a motive to make use of the free movement within this internal market. Th is is, for instance, the case when an employee from one Member State goes to work in another one because the pay and working conditions over there are better. But it also means that employers may choose to operate in a Member State with lower labour costs. Th is could be a boost for the economic development of the Member State concerned, but more oft en this is regarded as leading to a 'race to the bottom': Member States try to be more competitive by cutting back their employment protection. 18 Th rough the diff erence in pay level and employment protection between the Member States the labour costs for the production of goods and services continue to vary greatly in the various Member States of the European internal market. However, it is not quite clear whether and to what extent the competition between the Member States is falsifi ed by these diff erences and whether this leads to a downward spiral as regards employment protection of workers, or to social dumping. Th e relative labour costs not only depend on direct and indirect wage costs, but also on other factors such as productivity, which in its turn depends on the means and techniques of production used, the employees' level of training and the general material and administrative infrastructure of the country concerned. Th erefore the absolute diff erence in wage 16 Case costs as such is not a source of unfair competition or social dumping. 19 A recent study shows that, from the perspective of the relative labour costs, labour costs transposed into purchasing power and in terms of productivity in the EU, Member States do not diff er all that much. 20 In addition, it is apparent that the diff erences in wages and employment protection between the Member States are no longer a matter of diff erences between the new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe and the socalled old Member States. In a number of new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe the pay level has increased more rapidly than the level of productivity over the past ten years. 21 Th e 'old' Member States such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Luxembourg are the ones which, generally speaking, have a competitive advantage because of their weaker employment protection and low amounts of taxes and social security contributions withheld. Th is explains why, in practice, delocalisation has not so much taken place between old and new Member States, but rather to these three Member States. 22 In the past decade we have witnessed how undertakings have been using the existing diff erences in labour costs as an argument to move establishments within the internal market or to put pressure on the local level of pay and employment protection through collective bargaining. 23 Th e undertakings clearly use the diff erence in labour costs between the Member States as a competitive element. In that sense the European internal market has created a kind of regulatory competition between the Member States which also leads to competition between the employees of the Member States concerned.
Still, it would be wrong to state that within the European internal market the labour costs in the various EU Member States are kept so artifi cially low as to cause unfair competition and social dumping. 24 Moreover, from a political point of view it is not very likely that social achievements would be shoved aside just like that at the national level. 25 Th e impact of the EU economic governance on the employment protection in the Member States is undoubtedly much bigger than the impact of the internal market rules on free movement as such.
Th is does not alter the fact that in certain branches of the economy, such as in the construction industry, transport industry and agriculture and horticulture wage competition between the employees of these countries can be felt. Th is is especially the case when the pay and employment protection applicable in the Member State concerned is not respected and adequate control is lacking. In addition, there is the expansion of the so-called grey economy, such as bogus self-employment, subcontracting and temporary agency work which render control even more diffi cult. Th ese practices appear to be a bigger cause of unfair competition and social dumping within the European internal market than the diff erences in pay and employment protection as such. 26 Incidentally, the European internal market facilitates the development of these practices and the lack of control.
THE TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LABOUR LAW IN CROSS-BORDER SITUATIONS

PRINCIPLE: FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
Social competition in terms of labour law does not only occur between Member States, but also within a Member State, more specifi cally when the job in question has a cross-border aspect. Yet this was not the intention, as the original Article 48 EEC (now Article 45 TFEU) stated very clearly that the free movement of workers within the Union entails the abolition of any discrimination on grounds of nationality between the workers of the Member States as regards employment, pay and other working conditions. Th is principle means that migrating workers are entitled to the same pay and working conditions in the Member State where they work as those applicable to that Member State's own citizens. Th is prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality was also explicitly included in Article 7 Regulation 1612/68 27 (now replaced by Article 7 Regulation 492/2011 28 ) which for the application of this prohibition refers to the 'territory of … Member States'. Article 7(4) of these Regulations also declares any provision of collective or individual employment contracts that is in confl ict with this territorially applicable prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality legally null and void.
Th is requirement of equal treatment as regards pay and working conditions with the workers in the State of employment was not only inspired by concern about the social protection of migrant workers, but also by the wish to protect the Member States' own workers against workers from other Member States who might be willing to work for lower social conditions. Th e Court of Justice for its part has linked this Intersentia requirement of equal treatment with the workers of the State of employment to Article 117 EEC (now Article 152 TFEU) in which the Member States recognise the necessity to promote the workers' standard of living and working conditions. Th e CJ stated expressly that the absolute nature of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality must guarantee the nationals of the State of employment that they will not be harmed by any off er to, or acceptance by, nationals of other Member States of less favourable working conditions than those valid in the national legislation of the State of employment. 29 However, the Court of Justice decided that a posted employee of a crossborder service provider is not a worker within the meaning of Article 39 EC (now Article 45 TFEU) and Regulation 1612/68 (now Regulation 492/1011). 30 Th e fact that these workers are excluded from the application of the Treaty provision on the free movement of workers has fundamental legal consequences. Th e question as to which employment protection scheme these workers can take recourse should, for the Court, be answered on the basis of the principles underlying the free movement of services, more specifi cally the right of these employees' employer to provide his services in another Member State without distinction in terms of nationality and without any other obstacles. In this legal context the application of the labour legislation of the host country has been regarded as an obstacle to the free movement of services by the employer concerned. In principle, he should have the right to continue to apply the labour law of the country of origin to his employees. In that case the possible application of the employment protection of the host State, should, since it can be an obstacle to the free movement of services, be justifi ed for reasons of public interest and be proportional to this purpose (the so-called rule of reason). 31 
THE TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LABOUR LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Th e application of the principle of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 45 TFEU and in Article 7 of Regulation 492/2011 does not, however, always guarantee cross-border workers the application of the labour legislation of the country where they work at a certain moment. In principle, the rules of private international law (PIL) remain fully applicable and on the basis of these rules it is possible that the labour legislation of another country is applicable. Th ese rules were laid down in the Rome I Convention of 19 June 1980 (Rome I Convention). 33 At the end of 2009 this instrument was replaced by Rome I Regulation. 34 Th e basis of these PIL instruments is the freedom of choice of the parties (Article 3 Rome I Convention and Article 3 Rome I Regulation). So, in principle, the parties of an employment contract have the freedom to depart from the territorial application of the labour law of the country where the activities are carried out. Still, this freedom of choice is limited. For employment contracts Articles 6 and 7 Rome I Convention and Articles 8 and 9 Rome I Regulation contain specifi c rules with regard to the determination of the law applicable to individual employment contracts, both in situations in which the parties have made a choice of law and in situations where no choice of law has been made. In the absence of a choice of law the principle is that the employment contract is subject to the law of the country where the employee usually carries out his job (or from where he usually carries out his job), 35 even when he is temporarily employed in another country. 36 When, as a rule, this employee does not carry out his job in the same country, the law of the country where the employer's establishment is situated is applicable. However, these arrangements are put aside if the circumstances as a whole show that the employment contract is linked more closely with another country, in which case the law of that other country applies. 37 Th e law determined in the absence of a choice of law is sometimes referred to as 'objective applicable law'.
However, even if a choice of law has been made the employee may not lose the protection he enjoys on the basis of the mandatory provisions of the 'objective applicable law' (Article 6(1), Rome I Convention and Article 8(1), Rome I Regulation). Moreover, pursuant to Article 7(1), Rome I Convention or Article 9 Rome I Regulation it is also possible to apply the 'overriding mandatory provisions' of the law of another country. Th ese could, for instance, be invoked if the employee is temporarily employed in such a diff erent country, as, for instance, in the case of posting. But the case law was, and is, not very clear as regards the question as to which 'overriding mandatory provisions' can be applied to posted workers.
So the application of these PIL rules, as harmonised at EU level, can have as a result that work carried out on the territory of a certain Member State is not, or only to a limited extent, subject to the labour law of that country. Indeed, according to these rules a posted employee continues to be subject to the labour legislation of the habitual place of work because he does not 'habitually' work on the territory of the country in which he is temporarily posted.
THE TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LABOUR LAW UNDER PRESSURE AS A RESULT OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF SERVICES
Free movement of services and the territorial application of labour law
However, the strict application of these PIL rules has been nuanced by the case law of the Court of Justice and later by the European legislature. Indeed, the Court of Justice did not rule out that posted employees could be made subject to a number of provisions of the labour law of the Member State in which they had been posted, insofar as there is a balance between the right to free movement of services as exercised by the employers concerned and the employment protection of the employees concerned. 38 In Rush Portuguesa the Court expressly stated that Union law does not prevent Member States from applying their legislation or collective labour agreements between the social partners for all those who -even temporarily -are employed on their territory, irrespective of their employer's country of establishment. 39 Th e principles of the Rush Portuguesa judgment were once again confi rmed by the Court in Vander Elst. 40 Still, in this judgment the Court stressed other points than in Rush Portuguesa. In Vander Elst the Court restricts itself to the national rules of public policy, such as provisions on minimum wages and starts from the idea that the application of the labour law of the country of origin -in this case Belgium -should be suffi cient to exclude 'any substantial risk of workers being exploited or of competition between undertakings being distorted' (paras. 23 and 25). In later judgments the Court stated that the application of the law of the receiving country is only allowed in the 42 Th is is in the fi rst place apparent from the legal basis which was used for this Directive, and which is part of the Free Movement of Services Chapter in the Treaties. Th ere is no reference whatsoever to the Treaty provisions with regard to the free movement of workers. Its fi rst intention is to facilitate the free movement of services by matching the Member States' legislation on the labour law applicable to posted workers.
Its provisions show that Directive 96/71 is an instrument of coordination and not of harmonisation. Th is is explicitly confi rmed by Recital 13 and in the case law of the Court of Justice. 43 In no way does this instrument harmonise elements of the Member States' labour law.
Th erefore this Directive can be regarded as a PIL instrument in the sense that is a particularisation of Article 7 Rome I Convention and Article 9 Rome I Regulation on the basis of which eff ect may be given to mandatory rules of the law of a country other than that whose law is applicable pursuant to Article 6 Rome I Convention and Article 8 Rome I Regulation. 44 Th is could concern the law of the country on whose territory the worker is temporarily employed. So, the PWD does not change the law applicable to the labour relations pursuant to the above described rules of private Intersentia international law, but establishes, in line with what is made possible by Article 7 Rome I Convention and Article 9 Rome I Regulation, which 'special' mandatory provisions of the labour law of the country of temporary employment apply, 'whatever the law applicable to the employment relationship'. 45 Th e PWD clarifi es the possibility off ered by PIL. It actually concerns a harmonisation of what the host State could consider to be 'special mandatory law' with regard to posted workers. In that sense Directive 96/71 off ers the worker additional protection and strengthens the territorial scope of the labour law of the host State and the territorial application of the Member States' labour law. 46 Th e Posted Workers Directive does not impose the application of all of the labour law provisions of the receiving State, but only of those provisions that constitute the core of mandatory provisions for minimum protection (the so-called hard core), more specifi cally (see Article 3(1)): maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; minimum number of paid annual holidays; minimum wages; conditions for the posting of employees, in particular by temporary employment agencies; health, safety and hygiene in the workplace; protective measures for special groups of employees (pregnant women, youngsters); provisions regarding equal treatment and nondiscrimination. Th e Directive has laid down this hard core as part of Union law and as a result the Member States are obliged to apply this hard core to posted workers. 47 However, the Directive does limit the method the Member States can use for this. Only the following provisions qualify: legal and administrative provisions and/ or collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable and in so far as these concern the activities intended in the annex. 48 As for the collective agreements, Article 3(8) specifi es which labour agreements or arbitration awards qualify, especially regarding the general validity of these norms for all undertakings that belong to the occupational group or industry concerned and are subject to the territorial scope of these agreements or decisions. Minimum wages that have not been laid down through these legal instruments are not minimum wages within the meaning of this Directive and therefore cannot be imposed by the Member States in the case of cross-border provision of services. Th e Court reached this very strict interpretation in Laval and Rüff ert. 49 Th e objectives of this coordination instrument are multiple, if not paradoxical. 50 Its fi rst aim is the promotion of the free movement of services by regulating which 45 See, expressly, this parenthesis in Article 3(1), fi rst paragraph PWD. Th is concerns 13 activities, especially in construction, demolition and maintenance. On the basis of Article 3(10) the Member States can also apply collective agreements or arbitration awards to other activities. 49 Case C-341/05, Laval, paras. 70 and 71 and Case C-346/06, Rüff ert, para. 31. 50 See for a recent account of this paradox, the opinion of 18 September 2014 of Advocate-General Wahl in case C-396/13, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry, paras. 26-32. Member State's labour law is applicable to the employees of the cross-border provider of services. But simultaneously, it aims at being an instrument to prevent social dumping and unfair competition. It represents a compromise between the competing interests of the Member States sending out foreign workers and those receiving them. 51 Both of these objectives have been explicitly recognised by the Court of Justice. 52 Yet, the case law of the Court of Justice also makes it clear that the receiving States' room to manoeuvre with a view to applying additional elements of their labour law to posted workers is very limited. As regards the provision in Article 3(7) PWD, the Court expressly stated in Laval that this cannot be interpreted to the eff ect that it allows the receiving Member State to make the performance of services dependent on compliance with terms and conditions of employment that exceed the mandatory provisions for minimum protection. Th e level of protection that the receiving Member State has to guarantee for workers posted on its territory is in principle limited to the 'hard core' provisions, unless pursuant to the law or collective labour agreements valid in the Member State of origin the working conditions and circumstances are already more favourable for these workers. 53 On the other hand, Article 3(10) PWD does allow the Member States to extend that hard core 'on matters other than those (…) in the case of public policy provisions'. Th is refers to terms and conditions of employment that are not part of the list included in Article 3(1). However, in its judgment Commission v. Luxembourg, the Court of Justice gave a strict interpretation of these provisions. According to the Court the exception of public policy is a derogation of the fundamental principle of the free provision of services, which has to be conceived strictly and whose scope cannot be determined unilaterally by the Member States. For the Court public policy can only be invoked when there is a real and suffi ciently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. 54 Th is interpretation of the concept of 'public policy' actually means a serious restriction of the Member States' ability to impose the application of other elements of their labour law to their posted employees on the basis of this provision.
In Rüff ert the Court furthermore explained that the Member States, apart from their public policy claim, do not have the possibility to guarantee the avoidance of social dumping and to ensure fair competition in any other way than through the strict interpretation of the possibilities off ered by the Directive. In Rüff ert the Court expressly states that imposing minimum wages cannot be regarded as a measure to protect employees which could possibly justify an obstacle to the free provision of services when these wages only apply to the performance of government assignments and not to private assignments in the same industry and region. 55 56 In the Court's opinion the strict application of the PWD and the possibilities it off ers is suffi cient to avoid social dumping. Th us this Directive has actually become the maximum protection which can be invoked by posted workers. 57 Th e CJ very recently confi rmed this position in a judgment of 19 September 2014. 58 On the basis of his analysis of this case law, Advocate-General Wahl opines that the Court has seemingly shift ed its focus from the protection of the domestic labour market to the freedom to provide services. 59 Th e CJ has tried to save both objectives of the PWD. First, as an instrument of employment protection, it contributes to creating a level playing fi eld of protection of all workers active on the territory of the host State. But, second, as an internal market instrument it allows employers to make use of the competitive advantages of the diff erences in wages and employment protection between Member States. receiving country, non-observance of the rest and work periods and rules on wellbeing at work, failure to compensate the expenses of posting such as accommodation expenses, bad housing of the employees concerned, pyramids of sub-contractors that make control diffi cult, U-turn constructions through brass plate fi rms, etc. 61 As regards these control measures Article 5 PWD expressly states that the Member States have to take appropriate measures when the provisions of this Directive are not complied with. In its case law the CJ has always emphasised that the Member State whose pay and working conditions apply can enforce the application of these rules with appropriate means. 62 Th e CJ accepted, for instance, as compatible with EU law a system of several liability of the main contractor to pay the minimum wages to his subcontractors' employees. 63 Registration prior to the employment of posted workers was also considered by the Court to be an acceptable control measure. 64 Furthermore, the Court considered the request that a translation of certain documents in the language of the receiving Member State be kept in the workplace to be justifi ed. 65 And recently, the CJ also accepted the Belgian legislation under which the recipient of services performed by workers posted by a service provider established in another Member State is required to present the data identifying those workers to the competent authorities, before those workers begin to work. 66 However, control measures in the receiving State can run into legal limits. According to the Court these measures are also subject to a rule of reason test. 67 the service provider concerned already had to keep similar records pursuant to the legislation of the Member State where he was established. 68 Th e Court also criticised the fact that prior to the posting permission had to be requested for the employment and entry of posted workers who are not nationals of a Member State. 69 More recently the Court ruled that, with regard to the self-employed, the information requested by Belgium prior to the beginning of the activities, was too detailed. 70 Th e Court, however, expressly confi rmed in this judgment that the objective of combating social fraud and the prevention of abuse, notably false self-employment and moonlighting, can be objectives to justify possible restrictions of the free movement of services. In this respect the Court also referred to the objective to protect the fi nancial balance of the social security schemes, the objective to prevent unfair competition and social dumping and the objective to protect employees and self-employed persons. 71 As a result of this restrictive case law of the Court of Justice in the context of the increasing use, according to some misuse, the demand for more mandatory European rules on the enforcement of the provisions of the PWD has been increasing. In this context Directive 2014/67/EU was adopted on 15 May 2014. 72 Th is new Enforcement Directive is intended to establish a general framework of measures and control mechanisms that should lead to a better and more uniform implementation, application and enforcement of the PWD in practice, among which measures to prevent and fi ght any misuse and skirting of the applicable rules. For instance, in this new Directive an indicative, non-exhaustive list of qualitative criteria has been included that are characteristic of both the temporary nature inherent to the concept of posting and of the existence of a real link between the employer and the Member State from where the posting takes place (Article 4). It is the intention to prevent all forms of misuse, for instance long-term postings, repeated replacements of posted workers or the use of socalled letter-box fi rms. If such misuses are identifi ed, the PWD would not be applicable. However, this new Directive does not indicate which employment law would then be applicable to the workers concerned. Th is is presumably the law of the host State.
A crucial provision in the new Directive is Article 9 that outlines which control measures may be taken by the receiving Member State. It has been agreed that this list will not be limitative. But in exchange the European Commission was given the mandate to test all other measures the Member States could take against the requirements set by the Court of Justice with regard to the prohibition of obstructing the free movement of services in a disproportionate way.
Article 12 contains another important provision, more specifi cally the several liability in the case of sub-contracting. Th e Member States can introduce forms of several liability of the direct main contractor. As for the construction industry, this is said to amount to an obligation. Furthermore, the Member States can also apply several liability to contracts of other intermediaries than the direct contracting parties.
We will have to wait and see whether this Enforcement Directive is an effi cient instrument to counter the misuse in posting. Still, it is a fact that this Directive does not change the legal framework within which posting is possible, nor the employment protection for the posted workers. Th e regulatory competition within a Member State made possible by this continues to be maintained.
THE POSTED WORKERS' POSITION AT THE CROSS-ROADS OF LEGAL RULES AND OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS
From the previous analysis it follows that pursuant to Union law the posted workers' position in terms of labour law is situated at the intersection of applicable rules of law. In addition, it is also at the crossroads of the economic interests of the parties concerned, i.e. the Member States, the employees and the employers (both those making use of posting and those normally economically active in the receiving country).
As far as the rules of law are concerned this is a matter of the territorial application of labour law and the principle of equal treatment for all work carried out on the territory of a Member State on the one hand, and the 'country of origin principle' of free movement of services on the other. Both are guaranteed by Union law. Th e fi rst principle does not only aim at protecting cross-border workers by giving them the right to the same treatment as the other workers in the State of employment, but also at protecting the latter against social competition by the migrant workers. Th e second principle aims at protecting the cross-border service providers against unjustifi ed obstacles to the free movement of services that would be used if the country where the party concerned temporarily provides services were to try to apply its own rules of law to that party. It illustrates the 'trade-off between regulatory neutrality and regulatory competition [which] accounts for fundamental ambiguity of internal market law towards social dumping'. 73 Th e PWD and the strict interpretation by the CJ of the possibilities the receiving States have to grant supplementary protection to the posted employee, on top of the protection off ered by this Directive, strike a legally precarious balance between those Th is discrepancy was especially striking in Vicoplus. 74 In this case the Court of Justice held that workers posted by a temporary employment agency actually do enter the labour market of the Member State to which they are posted and therefore do fall within the transitional provisions on the free movement of workers in the Accession Treaties. Th e Court holds the view that these workers eff ectively enter the labour market of the host Member State because during the period of their posting the posted workers normally have a job within the user undertaking which would have otherwise have been carried out by workers of that undertaking. 75 Yet the Court does not conclude that these workers are migrating workers within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU, for in that case they could invoke the right to equal treatment with the local workers. But the judgment does indicate that the posting is at the cross-roads of two elements of Union law on the internal market, notably the free movement of workers and the free movement of services. With regard to the employment protection of these workers the Court continues to give priority to the provisions on the free movement of services. 76 At the level of the Council of Europe, too, there was criticism of the approach in the PWD and the case law of the Court of Justice. As a result of a collective complaint against Sweden the European Committee of Social Rights, in a decision of 3 July 2013, was very critical of the restrictions imposed by the PWD and the case law of the Court of Justice regarding the application of Swedish labour law to workers posted in Sweden. 77 Formally, the complaint was against the Swedish legislation which had transposed the CJ's case law into national law, especially in the abovementioned cases Laval, Rüff ert, and Commission v. Luxembourg. In the context of this contribution it is particularly important to highlight the Committee's view that the Swedish legislation is in confl ict with Article 19(4) of the European Social Charter which orders the States not to treat foreign workers less favourably than their own workers as regards wages, working conditions and collective bargaining. Th e Committee does recognise that posted workers fi nd themselves in a special situation and that they diff er from migrant workers who go and work for an employer in another Member State on their own initiative. But for the Committee, posted workers are workers who reside and work legally on the territory of the host country. Th erefore they fall within the application of the prohibition of discrimination of Article 19(4) of the Social Charter. So, for the Committee, during their stay and employment they have the right to equal treatment with the host country's own workers as regards pay and other employment terms. 78 Furthermore, the Committee holds the view that the restrictions on collective actions, which, pursuant to the Swedish legislation, are only allowed if their purpose is to guarantee a minimum protection for the posted workers, and not if their purpose is to eff ectively obtain the same employment protection as the country's own workers, are in confl ict with Article 19(4)(b) and Article 6 (the right to collective bargaining and collective action) of the European Social Charter.
In this decision the Committee makes no attempt to disguise its criticism of the legal order of the EU. It does recognise that facilitating cross-border service provision by the posting employer is an important part of the economic freedoms of the EU, which are held in high esteem by the Committee. But from the perspective of the values, principles and fundamental rights laid down in the European Social Charter, these market freedoms cannot a priori be more valuable than these fundamental rights. For the Committee, Union law must be interpreted and applied to the eff ect that, among other things, it must recognise the fundamental right to equal treatment and the fundamental right of trade unions to strive for the protection and improvement of the living and working conditions of the employees. 79 Besides, posting is not only situated at the cross-roads of the free movement of workers and the right to equal treatment on the one hand and the free movement of services of the employer on the other; legally it is also situated at the cross-roads of Union law on the free movement of workers and Union law concerning the rules applicable to an employment contract (PIL). Pursuant to the rules in the Rome I Convention and Rome I Regulation, the law of the country of habitual employment applies to the employment contract, and this country is not supposed to change in the case of temporary employment in another country, among which are posting activities. 80 But the theoretical continuation of the application of the law of the country of habitual employment can be mitigated by the application of 'overriding mandatory provisions' or rules of 'public policy (ordre public)' of another country, in particular the country where a posted worker temporarily works. Th e source of inspiration of the PIL rules is the protection of the weaker contracting party. 81 In this respect, too, the PWD tried to fi nd a balance. But although the applicable PIL rules give the receiving Member State a certain level of fl exibility to apply parts of its employment protection, the Court of Justice in its case law on the PWD has seriously restricted this fl exibility by stating that these Member States may not impose protection that exceeds the protection allowed by the PWD. Otherwise, there would be a confl ict with EU internal market law.
From the fact that in its case law the Court interprets any abrogation of the country of origin principle very strictly it is clear that the Court implicitly gives priority to the interests of those that make use of the free movement of services. 82 In so doing the Court has paved the way for the use of the competitive advantage off ered by the possibility to carry out activities and provide services in a Member State under employment conditions which apply in another (read cheaper) Member State, with the exception of 'hard core' provisions listed in Article 3(1) PWD. Th is was even recognised by the European Commission in a recent document in which it states that 'posting workers allows companies to exploit their competitive advantages across borders'. 83 For some, the CJ's case law distorted the 'the delicate balance between competing objectives'. 84 Th is case law is also said to run counter to what the authors of the Directive intended in 1996. Th ey are said to have off ered more room for manoeuvre to the receiving Member States through the provisions of Article 3(7) and (10) PWD. 85 In any case, as a result, the regulatory competition regarding wage and employee protection between the Member States is being imported into the Member States themselves. 86 Moreover, it overturns the principle of territorial application of the labour law of the Member States which was laid down in the EEC Treaty of 1957 in the instruments regarding the freedom of movement for workers, thus allowing the exploitation of the competitive advantage of companies established in Member States with low wage standards. 87 81 Th e discussion on this regulatory competition within the territory of a Member State diff ers from the discussion on the regulatory competition between Member States. In the latter case this concerns goods and services produced in a Member State through cheap labour and subsequently exported to another Member State. Diff erences in standard of living and productivity could perhaps be a justifi cation for this regulatory competition between Member States. Very recently the Court of Justice explicitly acknowledged that such regulatory competition is fully lawful in the context of the EU internal market. Member States to which goods or services produced in another Member State are exported, may not require that for the production of such goods or services the minimum wages fi xed by their legislation should apply. Th e Court said that by imposing such a minimum wage linked to the cost of living in that Member State, but which bears no relation to the cost of living in the Member State in which the services are performed, the fi rst Member State prevents subcontractors established in this Member State from deriving a competitive advantage from the diff erences between the respective rates of pay. For the Court, this goes beyond what is necessary to ensure that the objective of employee protection is attained. 88 But this labour cost competition is far less justifi able if the wage competition occurs on the territory of one and the same Member State. In such a case one can hardly refer to a diff erence in labour costs justifi ed by the diff erence in productivity and standard of living.
However, for others a Member State's wish to apply its own pay and employment protection to posted workers is inspired by protectionist motives, more specifi cally with a view to shielding its own undertakings from the competition within the European internal market said to be practiced by undertakings from other Member States. 89 Furthermore, the application of the labour law of the host country to (potentially) posted workers from another Member State is not always considered to be in the interest of the posted workers themselves. It could also be the case that as a result of the application of the receiving state's labour law posting in that country is no longer profi table for the principal, with the eff ect that the secondment does not take place and the employee concerned runs the risk of losing his job. From this point of view wage competition is not regarded as unfair competition, but rather as a normal form of competition within the European internal market and 'the natural functioning of economic integration'. 90 Even the PWD itself would have unacceptable protective characteristics, like being 'anti-competitive' and 'socially problematic', since it would protect local workers and would prevent workers from 
CONCLUSION
Th e European internal market has unmistakably fuelled and strengthened the social competition between the workers of the Member States. Th e market integration has made it possible to export and off er, without restriction, goods and services produced in a Member State under the pay and working conditions valid there. Th e fact that the European Union only marginally harmonised the pay and working conditions applied in the Member States, has brought about a form of social competition that puts pressure on the employment protection in the Member States. Still, this competition as such does not appear to have led to a general downward spiral of employment protection. Th is has to do, among other things, with the diff erences in wage and employment protection related to the productivity and the standard of living in the Member States concerned. However, it does appear that some countries wanted to strengthen their competitive position through a restriction of the labour costs. Furthermore, the internal market off ers undertakings and employers the possibility to skirt around the labour legislation applicable in the Member State in which the employee actually works or to avoid its application altogether. Th is is especially the case for employees in cross-border employment. At the time of the establishment of the PWD in the 90s, 92 as well as very recently during the discussions in the Council of Ministers about the proposal for the Enforcement Directive, it was obvious that the traditional posting states, i.e. states with high unemployment fi gures and low levels of social protection, want to off er their undertakings as many opportunities as possible to use their competitive advantage on the European internal market through the cross-border posting of workers. Th e application of the labour law of the host country is only guaranteed to a limited extent as a result of which this Member State is faced with internal social competition.
More than ever before, the European Union with its internal market continues to struggle with the balance between, on the one hand, the freedoms of the internal market and the social protection the separate Member States have introduced on the other. From the above it is clear that the PWD and the case law of the Court of Justice try to reconcile, with disputable success, the prevention of unfair competition on the one hand and the guarantee of eff ective competition on the other. 93 For some authors, the answer to this is more European social regulation, inter alia, by using framework Directives that would still leave room to manoeuvre for the national legislature. Fundamental social rights should also play a bigger part in this debate. Th e fi elds in which labour law has been harmonised so far, are too limited and off er no solution to the social competition that has arisen within the European internal market. 94 Others in their turn advocate a cutting back of the European internal market's infl uence on national labour law, and in particular on its territorial application. Labour law should, in the fi rst place, remain the responsibility and competence of the Member States. 95 In this context some propose to introduce in the PWD more possibilities for the host State to apply parts of its employment protection to posted workers, possibly via Article 3(7) PWD. 96 As for the fi rst option, it remains unclear to what extent more European labour legislation will lead to more and better employment protection. Indeed, recent discussions on the proposals of the Commission -for instance on the Enforcement Directive -have in any case shown that it is very diffi cult to achieve a political agreement at the European level in this respect. Th e risk that the European labour legislation which would come about in this context will, rather, lead to a decrease in the social protection of workers is not unreal.
As for the second option, the European institutions -among which is the Court of Justice -will have to be prepared to limit the infl uence of the so-called negative market integration on national social law by giving the Member States more room to manoeuvre with regard to the social legislation they want to apply. 
